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CHANGING CONCEPTS OF CABOTAGE: A CHALLENGE
TO THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES CARRIERS
IN INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION?
By GEORGE S. ROBINSONt
I. UNITED STATES POLICY GUIDING NEGOTIATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL
ROUTES AND CAPACITIES
F OR MANY years international air carriers of the United States have
enjoyed the relatively large profits and economic security flowing
from a lion's share of the international passenger and cargo market. Sub-
stantial Government subsidization' of airlines, good business management,
an almost inflexible adherence by United States negotiators to the Bermuda
Agreement! principles, and a large resource of United States citizens pur-
suing international business activities and the normal tourist trade3 abroad,
have all contributed in providing the United States with a strong upper
hand in securing an extremely sizeable chunk of the international air
transportation market, that is, until recently. The decrease in the share of
t A.B., Bowdoin College; LL.B., University of Virginia; LL.M., McGill University.
I Substantial subsidization of United States international carriers initially by the Federal Gov-
ernment had dwindled to nothing at the end of 30 Sept. 1967. At that time, carriers were receiving
mail revenue, but no direct subsidy: C.A.B., Costs and Statistics Division, Bureau of Accounts and
Statistics, AIR CARRIER AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS, VOL. XV-3, Quarter Ended 30 Sept. 1967.
2 Air Services Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom, and the Final
Act of the Civil Aviation Conference, signed and entered into force at Bermuda, 11 Feb. 1946;
[1946] 17 U.S.T. 683, 60 Stat. 1499. It should be noted that the benefits of the Bermuda principles
to the United States are highly questionable among some authoritative quarters. In 1960, Colonel
Harold A. Jones, former U.S. Representative to the ICAO Council and member of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board, wrote an article, The Equation of Aviation Policy, 27 J. AIR L. & CoM. 221 (1960),
in which he stated, in part, at 234, that "The sacred 'Bermuda principles' are beginning to cost the
United States a lot of money. They were fine in 1946 when we generated about 70% of the trans-
atlantic and transpacific traffic, and carried about 80% of it. Now, these same 'principles,'-'fifth
freedom,' plus 'reciprocity of routes,' 'reciprocity of traffic centers' and 'dog leg routes'-exposed the
great United States traffic market to dozens of international airlines of other nations, many of
which generated little traffic, operating chiefly for reasons of politics and pride, and dependent upon
the American tourist dollar. Our own airlines were carrying about 40% of the transatlantic
traffic, although the United States generated about 71% of it. Were we trading transatlantic dollars
for Paris and Rome 'fifth freedom' nickels?"
'See id., wherein the amount of U.S. generated transatlantic market in 1946 is discussed. The
following breakdown of passengers carried by air between Europe and the United States in 1967
indicates that despite the increasing number of foreign carriers entering the transatlantic market










Number carried by U.S. Airlines-,120,801
Statistics available from the U.S. Department of
Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service.
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the North Atlantic, indeed the entire transatlantic, market enjoyed by
United States carriers became a matter of public concern officially when
President John F. Kennedy appointed a Steering Committee in 1961 to
make a detailed study of United States participation in international air
transportation, to isolate problem areas, and to formulate corrective
measures and appropriate policies. In 1963, the Steering Committee
concluded its study and submitted its findings and policy recommenda-
tions in a report4 which was approved by President Kennedy.
One of the most interesting facets of the report dealt with the discus-
sion by the Steering Committee of bilateral agreements, vis-fi-vis present
and future United States negotiation policies. In a policy statement, a
discussion of United States philosophy guiding bilateral air transport
negotiations appeared in part as follows:
The United States will maintain the present framework of bilateral agree-
ments by which air routes are exchanged among nations and the rights to
carry traffic on them are determined according to certain broad principles.
The substitution of a multilateral agreement seems even less feasible or accept-
able today than when first attempted at the Chicago Conference of 1944
[Emphasis added.].
In part, justification for this conclusion was that the philosophy behind
bilateral agreements
rejects the concept that agreements should divide the market or allocate to
the carrier of a particular country a certain share of the traffic. The latter
concept would surely restrict the growth of international aviation and would
result in endless bickering among nations as to their proper share of traffic.
It is totally foreign to our basic trade policies and would clearly harm the
long-range interest of United States carriers as well as those of the traveller
and shipper.5
It is apparent that the reasoning in the policy statement was substan-
tially influenced by what the Steering Committee thought the interna-
tional aviation economic structure should be, and specifically by one of
the terms of reference of the Committee: "to determine the effect of this
diminution [in transatlantic traffic carried by United States carriers] on
the United States balance of payments."' What apparently was not given
due consideration was reasoned anticipation of what other countries might
accomplish by cooperating to present an effective economic blocking action
that would dilute United States superiority in the area of bilateral route
' The Steering Committee was composed of N.E. Halaby, then Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Agency, as chairman; Kenneth R. Hansen, Bureau of the Budget, as Executive Secretary:
and members Alan S. Boyd, then with the Civil Aeronautics Board; Hallis B. Chenery of the Agency
for International Development; Griffith Johnson of the Department of State; C. Daniel Martin
of the Department of Commerce; and Frank K. Sloan of the Department of Defense. The subse-
quent report of the Committee was released by the Office of the White House Press Secretary on
24 April 1963, and is referred to as the "Statement on United States International Air Transport
Policy."
a 30 J. AIR L. & CoM. 76, 78 (1960). The text of the Policy Statement was reprinted in Volume
30 of the Journal of Air Law and Commerce, beginning at 76. For facility of reference, this source
for the Statement will be cited hereinafter.
' See Sackrey, Overcapacity in the United States International Air Transport Industry, 32 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 24, 48 (1966), wherein the purposes of the Steering Committee's investigation
are discussed.
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and capacity negotiations. With a little imagination and reasoned projec-
tion, it is not difficult to envision comparatively recent events as compos-
ing the initial steps in the creation of what could be a very important
politico-economic move to minimize United States effectiveness in bilateral
negotiations, i.e., alteration of the traditional concept of a cabotage area
and what constitutes domestic traffic.
II. THE ROLE OF ARTICLE 77 OF THE CHICAGO CONVENTION
To follow the evolution of indicative events, it is necessary to refer to
the history of the protracted dispute on Article 77 of the Chicago Con-
vention.7 In 1956, the Twelfth Session of the ICAO Assembly convened
and, among other things, resolved:
That the Council shall . . . formulate and circulate to Contracting States
its views on the legal, economic and administrative problems involved in
determining the manner in which the provisions of the Convention relating
to the nationality of aircraft shall apply to aircraft operated by international
operating agencies!
On 15 November 1956, the Air Transport Committee, which had been
directed by the Council to study Article 77 within the framework of the
entire Convention and pursuant to the Assembly resolution, submitted its
findings to the Council.9 Essentially, the Committee concluded that the
responsibilities under the Convention of a Contracting State could not be
assumed by an international operating agency; specifically, such an agency
could not authoritatively register its own aircraft, Such action was not
encompassed by the meaning of the "nationality of aircraft" provisions
in that Convention.
The Air Transport Committee report remained dormant until December
1959, when the League of Arab States requested the Council to make a
determination, regarding Article 77, as to the obligations under the Con-
vention of constituent States of the proposed Pan-Arab Airline when
Pan-Arab aircraft were operating into territories of other States."0 The
request was referred by the Council to a panel of experts for study. On
25 August 1960 the panel submitted its findings" which, like the Air
Transport Committee report, were mostly negative. The principal con-
clusions of the panel were that an international operating agency, or an
international organization, could not lawfully register an aircraft; it
further concluded that recording of aircraft on a register jointly estab-
lished by Contracting States of an international agency legally would not
satisfy the requirements of the Convention.
"Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), 7 Dec. 1944, art. 77, 61
Stat. 1180, 1202, T.I.A.S. 1591 (effective 4 April 1947) [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
8ICAO Assembly Resolution A2-13.
'Report of the Air Transport Committee on Problems of Nationality and Registration, ICAO
Doc. C-WP/2284 (15 Nov. 1956).
.o See generally, the paper of the ICAO Secretariat concerning the request of the League of
Arab States, ICAO Doc. C-WP/3091 (24 Feb. 1960).
" Report of the Panel of Experts on Article 77, ICAO Doc. PE-77/Report (30" June 1960)
attached to C-WP/3186 (25 Aug. 1960). For background work by the Panel of Experts, see gen-
erally, ICAO Doc. PE-77 Working Draft Nos. 2-18.
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For the proponents of a loose interpretation of Article 77, which would
accommodate the plans and needs of nations less developed than others in
international civil aviation, the two negative reports appear effectively to
block their pursuit of the Article 77 approach. Apparently, this was not to
be the case. With what one expects involved the patient, but determined,
solicitation of behind-the-scenes support from various Contracting States,
the issue again was opened in 1964, principally at the insistence of Mem-
ber State of Air Afrique.2 From 15 July to 24 July 1965, a Subcommit-
tee of the ICAO Legal Committee convened to consider the issue of Article
77 once more. In the report issued by the Subcommittee,5 two unanimous
decisions taken at the meeting were set forth:1"
(1) the decision taken by the Council pursuant to Article 77 of the Chicago
Convention will be binding on all Contracting States if it is made within
the scope of the authority given to the Council by that Article.
(2) these provisions [of the Convention relating to nationality of aircraft]
* . . include not only Articles 17 to 21 . . . but generally all articles of
the Convention which either expressly refer to nationality of aircraft
or imply it.
With these unanimous decisions, the door to an accommodating interpre-
tation of Article 77 had been set ajar substantially, principally by the
efforts of the States comprising Air Afrique. Further, by majority votes
of 10 to 415 and 10 to 316 the Subcommittee concluded, respectively,
(1) That the provisions of the Chicago Convention-without it being neces-
sary to amend them-are not an obstacle to the principle of joint inter-
national registration;
(2) That the determination made by the Council under Article 77 has
sufficient effect for the international registration in question to be
recognized by the other Contracting States and for the aircraft so
registered to have the benefit of rights and privileges equivalent to those
granted by national registration. 7
From this point on, every step toward the accommodation of Air Afrique
in the initial stages of its desire for legitimizing international registration
of aircraft was downhill. It is obvious that years of struggling with an
interpretation of Article 77, and the related unsatisfactory findings, had
created a climate in which most of the Contracting States were willing to
compromise the need for a strict legal interpretation (and, perhaps, a
protracted agony of undertaking to seek clarifying amendments to the
Convention) and settle for a political solution. The First Session of the
Legal Subcommittee had reached conclusions specifically with Air Afrique
in mind. The Second Session of the Subcommittee was to be devoted
1" Requests of L'Union Africaine et Malgache de Cooperation Economique and the United Arab
Republic, ICAO Doc. C-WP/4115 (1 Dec. 1964) and Corrigendum.
"ICAO Doc. LC/SC-Article 77 Report 24/7/65.41d., at 3.
" The United States delegation cast a negative vote on the first conclusion on the premise that
there had not been sufficient legal study of Article 77 to justify a Legal Subcommittee reversal of
the 1960 Panel of Experts.
" The United States delegation abstained in voting on the second conclusion of the Legal Sub-
committee.T Supra note 13, Annex B, at 13.
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almost entirely to developing a procedural and substantive structure
whereby Air Afrique could satisfy the political requirements attributed
to Article 77 by the Subcommittee.
Much haggling and compromising obviously must have footnoted the
entire proceedings of the Second Session of the Subcommittee, which
convened in Montreal in 1967. For purposes of the present discussion, one
significant event occurred which may have been the first patent indication
that an effective institution to undermine United States bilateral negotiat-
ing superiority was beginning to evolve. During the First Session of the
Subcommittee it was agreed"8
that, whether for joint registration" or for international registration, the
following criteria must be met:
(b) the operation of the aircraft must not give rise to any discrimination
against aircraft of other Contracting States.
In connection with criterion (b), certain articles of the Chicago Con-
vention were examined for applicability during the Second Session of the
Subcommittee. Among these was Article 7, the cabotage provision, regard-
ing which the Subcommittee reached the following agreement:
It was agreed that the mere fact of joint or international registration under
Article 77 would not operate to constitute the geographical area of the
multi-national group as a cabotage area'" [Emphasis added.].
The heated debate surrounding the exact wording of this statement was
extremely significant. In the words of the United States delegation to the
Second Session of the Subcommittee," "[r]aising this issue (regarding
cabotage) provoked one of the warmest debates of the entire meeting.""
According to its report, the United States delegation
informally discussed and then formally proposed that the cabotage issue be
raised specifically so as to preclude any notion that by simply establishing a
joint or international system of registration, the participating member states
could treat as cabotage the carriage of traffic between their territories."
The delegation report continues by observing that the United States
18 Supra note 13, at para. 5.
'" Id. at para. 8. In this paragraph of the 1965 Report of the Subcommittee, a distinction finally
was made between a joint air transport operating organization and an international operating agency.
Although Article 77 specifically states that the 'Council shall determine in what manner the pro-
visions of this Convention relating to nationality of aircraft shall apply to aircraft operated by in-
ternational operating agencies," the Subcommittee concluded that the provisions also cover joint air
transport operating organizations; that any other conclusion would render Article 77 and related
provisions ambiguous and confusing. This is precisely the issue which should have been resolved by
legal analysis, and amendatory clarification if necessary, but which was settled by patchwork com-
promises and cumbersome proposals of criteria to be followed by the Council in making an appro-
priate determination pursuant to the last sentence of Article 77.
20 ICAO Doc. LC/SC-Article 77-Report 7/2/67, para. 9.2 at 4.
" Report of the United States delegation to the Second Meeting of the Legal Subcommittee of
the International Civil Aviation Organization on Problems of Nationality and Registration of Air-
craft operated by International Agencies, submitted to the Secretary of State 6 July 1967, by A. I.
Mendelsohn, Chairman of the U.S. delegation. The Second Session of the Subcommittee was held
in Montreal from January 4-January 13, 1967. The U.S. delegation Report is referred to, herein-
after, simply as the Delegation Report.
2 Id. at 20.
1a Id. at 19.
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"initiative on this point was enthusiastically and openly supported by the
delegations of a!'. the major aviation states." As the African delegations and
those of other less developed countries increased the intensity of their
opposition to definitive discussion of the cabotage issue, the stronger
aviation countries increased their support of a definitive statement spe-
cifically precluding, within the framework of joint or international
aircraft registration, any alteration of the existing concept of cabotage.
The original United States proposal was to include, in the subsequent
report of the Subcommittee, a statement regarding cabotage as follows:
It was agreed that joint or international registration under Article 77 would
not operate to constitute the geographical area of the multi-national group
as a cabotage area. 4
Apparently, immediately before the noon recess, the Chairman of the
Subcommittee"2 was preparing to call for a vote on the issue. At this point,
it is helpful to quote the report of the United States delegation at some
length since the subsequent revealing events took place during the recess
and are not a matter of ICAO record. Mr. F. X. Ollassa6 called for an
adjournment before a vote could be taken," and the Subcommittee agreed
to adjourn for lunch. The following is an account, according to the United
States delegation report, of what immediately transpired:
During the ensuing recess, Messrs. Braure s and Ollassa indicated that, al-
though reluctantly, they could accept the proposal as submitted if the phrase
"the mere fact" were added. The proposal would thus read: "It was agreed
that the mere fact of joint or international registration under Article 77
would not operate to constitute the geographical area of the multi-national
group as a cabotage area."'"
The delegation report indicates that those countries supporting the original
United States proposal examined the amended proposal and concluded it
"had the very same meaning" as the original. The reasoning cited by the
report which attempted to justify acceptance of the amended proposal was
that there could be no objection
to the creation of a cabotage area between the states participating in the
international or joint system of registration if those states took the far more
significant step of establishing a federal union similar to that of the United
States.'
24Supra note 22.
" Mr. A. Garnault of France, elected as Chairman at the First Session of the Subcommittee, con-
tinued as Chairman of the Second Session.
21 Mr. Ollassa was the delegate from Congo (Brazzaville) and one of the chief spokesmen for
interested African States throughout the history of the Article 77 issue.
27 The Delegation Report states at 20 that "Just prior to the noon recess, it appeared that the
Chairman would call for a vote on this issue [U.S. proposal]-which would have been the first
vote of the entire session." The Report continues by observing that Chairman Garnault, "who him-
self supported the United States proposal, had counted the delegates who were present and had
ascertained that the proposal would pass." Obviously, Mr. Ollassa also recognized the probability
of the proposal being adopted and was pressed to call for the noon recess which would allow him
time to work out a compromising counterproposal with the United States delegation.
2s Mr. E. J. L. Braure was one of the delegates representing Senegal at the Second Session of the
Subcommittee.
2 Supra note 22.
30Id. at 21.
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When the Subcommittee reconvened after the noon recess, the United
States proposal, as amended, was adopted unanimously and included in
the Subcommittee report.
In reflecting upon the positions taken by the African delegations
regarding Article 77, the strong opposition to a definitive agreement flatly
precluding geographic boundaries of more than one State as a cabotage
area, and the reluctant acceptance by certain African delegates of the
amendatory addition to the United States proposal of the phrase "the mere
fact," all indicate that at least Air Afrique has future plans beyond the
simple resolution of the registration problem under Article 77. It is very
difficult to believe that such future plans envisaged only the possibility
that the Air Afrique Member States might wish to take the "significant
steps of establishing a federal union similar to that of the United States."
If that were true, an acommodating interpretation of Article 77 would
not be necessary; indeed, Article 77 and the related "nationality" provi-
sions of the Convention could be applied with relative ease much in the
same manner as they are applied to aircraft of the United States at the
present moment. One logical alternative conclusion regarding the approach
pursued by members of the African delegations is that even if the "mere
fact of joint or international registration" did not constitute a cabotage
area of the participating countries, something less than a federalism similar
to the United States, but more than joint or international registration,
could. For example, it is difficult to conceive of newly independent African
nations relinquishing respective sovereignties in the foreseeable future
sufficient to establish a federalism similar to that of the United States.
However, it is quite within the realm of possibility that the component
States of Air Afrique could establish economic and administrative integra-
tion on aviation matters to the extent that, for civil aviation purposes, all
sovereignty over these matters had been relinquished to an international
and/or joint operating agency sufficient to claim economic and administra-
tive "federalism" existed among the Air Afrique States. It is recognized
that the term "federalism," as used within the conceptual context of
transnational economic and administrative integration, distorts the classic
international law definitions of a federal structure. On the other hand, it
is very arguable that although the "mere fact," alone, of joint or inter-
national registration does not constitute a cabotage area of the member
States, that fact plus total or significant economic and administrative
integration of civil aviation matters will be sufficient to establish an
international cabotage area, i.e., an area which includes the boundaries
of several different countries. In any event, the door to this possibility, or
perhaps probability, has been opened-at least academically.
In September of 1967, the Sixteenth Session of the ICAO Legal Com-
mittee convened with the reports of the two sessions of the Subcommittee
on Article 77 taking up most of the time of the delegates. The full Com-
mittee disposed of the procedural problem (principally as regards the
embryonic plan of Air Afrique) attendant to the political solutions
reached at the two Subcommittee sessions. It is not necessary, for the
1968]
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purpose of the present discussion, to review the actions of the Council on
the Legal Committee report" dealing with Article 77, except to the extent
of noting that no adverse action was taken by the Council on that facet
of the report dealing with the cabotage issue. Presumably, it is now up to
the Air Afrique countries to formulate a joint air transport opetrating
organization and/or an international operating agency which will satisfy
the criteria ultimately adopted by the Council. However, even at this point,
the evolving pattern of an international cabotage area has not come to rest.
As seen in the discussion below, of the Swedish request for an interpretation
of Article 7,"1 the pattern comes into even sharper focus.
III. THE REQUEST BY SWEDEN FOR AN INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 7
OF THE CHICAGO CONVENTION
In the event that a criterion permitting legitimate argumentation for an
international cabotage area within a politico-economic framework less than
a "federal union similar to the United States" does not provide a totally
stable foundation for effective presentation of such an argument, Sweden
indirectly has supplied the means for strengthening it. A proposal by the
Representative of Sweden that the "Council agree to express a certain
opinion on the interpretation of Article 7"''i was given initial considera-
tion by the Council on 20 June 1966. Although not much importance was
attached to this request, in terms of substance as well as priority, by most
Member States of ICAO, a significant amount of material relating specifi-
cally to the Swedish problem has been developed. 4 Although, for pur-
poses of the principal discussion, it is not necessary to pursue a detailed
examination of the cabotage issue within the structure of the Chicago
Convention, it is important to glance at the issues being raised with respect
to Article 7 in order to develop a feeling for the related attitudes of ICAO
States prior to its formal consideration at the Sixteenth Session of the
ICAO Assembly, held in Argentina during September 1968."
Article 7 of the Convention reads as follows:
Each Contracting State shall have the right to refuse permission to the air-
craft of other Contracting States to take on in its territory passengers, mail
and cargo carried for remuneration or hire and destined for another point
"The Sixteenth Session of the Legal Committee submitted to the Council a report, which in-
cluded its advice to the Council on the issue of Article 77; see Report of the Legal Committee, 16th
Session, Doc. 8704, LC/155, Annex C. For the subsequent resolution adopted by the Council, in
partial reliance upon the advice and recommendations of the Legal Committee, see ICAO Doc.
8722-C/976 (20 Feb. 1968), Resolution Adopted by the Council on Nationality and Registration
of Aircraft Operated by International Operating Agencies.
aa Sweden first requested an interpretation of Article 7 by the Council. As seen in note 35,
infra, Sweden then requested that the item be included for discussion by the Executive Committee
at the Sixteenth Session of the ICAO Assembly.
aaThe Swedish proposal, or request, is set forth in an Information Paper (12 June 1966) to
ICAO Doc. C-WP/4406 (26 May 1966).
"4For a fairly complete discussion of the history and related facts of the Interpretation of
Article 7 of the Convention, presented by the Secretary General, see ICAO Doc. C-WP/4460
(24 Oct. 1966), including Appendices A-B.
' Sweden proposed that an additional item, entitled "Amendment to Article 7 of the Convention
on International Civil Aviation," be included in the provisional agenda for the Executive Com-
mittee of the Sixteenth Assembly; ICAO Doc. A16-WP/7, EX/1 (11 March 1968).
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within its territory. Each Contracting State undertakes not to enter into any
arrangements which specifically grant any such privilege on an exclusive
basis to any other State or an airline of any other State, and not to obtain
any such exclusive privilege from any other State."6
It is generally conceded that the first sentence of Article 7 simply reiter-
ates the principle of absolute sovereignty of a State over its territory and
superjacent airspace; only in this Article it is specifically with respect to
cabotage rights. It is the second sentence of Article 7 which is alleged to
create ambiguities and doubt. Sweden is of the opinion that the second
sentence could be legitimately subject to two different interpretations:
(a) Cabotage right must be granted on a non-exclusive basis, i.e., if one
State is granted cabotage rights, any other State may require to be
granted the same privilege.
(b) States may grant cabotage rights to another State exclusively, provided
this is not done "specifically," i.e., if it is not specified that these are
exclusive.37
The historical veracity or legal efficacy regarding these two interpreta-
tions are not at issue here. Explanations and views run from assertions that
Article 7 is a superfluous residue of an aborted attempt "to exchange traffic
rights for scheduled international air services on a multilateral basis,"38 to
the argument that a
deletion of the second sentence would clarify and simplify the situation ...
[since] States would still retain their right to refuse cabotage rights to other
States and become free to grant such rights in accordance with their proper
interests."
The recommendation of Sweden is important to the present discussion
from the point of view that a deletion of the second sentence of Article 7
would nullify the purpose of the cabotage provision, regardless of the
original reasons behind it. It is not difficult to envision the principal reason
as being protective of the domestic aviation rights not only of small States
whose economies and very political existences were dependent upon large
States immediately after World War II, but also as being an inarticulated
agreement to protect the potential domestic markets for all States by
permitting the grant of cabotage rights solely to one country, but not
exclusively. The following explanation of the United States proposal on
the cabotage issue at the Chicago Conference indicates the general view
of most States participating in the Conference:
It is the view of the United States that each country should, as far as possible,
come to control and direct its own international airlines. . . .This ... sug-
gests recognition of the principle that the people of each country must have
the dominant voice in their own transport systems. If air transport is not to
become an instrument of attempted domination, recognition of this principle
seems to be essential' [Emphasis added.].
"6Chicago Convention, art. 7, 61 Stat. 1182.
37 Supra note 35, at 1.3
8Id. at 2.
" Id. It should be noted that this essentially is the view stated by Sweden.
40 Supra note 34, Appendix A, para. 2.1, at 13.
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The delegate of the United States went on to say that for the above
reason, "this country reserves, and believes that every country will insist
on the right to reserve to itself, the internal traffic known as cabotage. .. ."
If the purpose of the cabotage provision was meant to have more effect
than simply a mutual agreement for mutual restraint against outside
political and economic domination of aviation in less developed countries,
specific exceptions to the sovereignty recognized in the first sentence of
Article 7 could have been included in the Convention so that alleged
violations would fall within the arbitration provisions of Articles 84-87,1
and be subject to the penalty imposing jurisdiction of the Assembly
pursuant to Article 88. In any event, the burden placed upon a com-
plainant State, of proving that certain cabotage rights were given on the
basis of "exclusivity," would in most, if not all, instances be insuperable.
However, such exceptions were not so included and one effect of Article
7 is an implied recognition that certain countries, which were not econom-
ically and politically independent in 1944, might well develop into eco-
nomically viable nations to the extent that external domination of domestic
aviation interests no longer would be a threat. It effectively is a recognition,
by a mutual or "gentleman's" agreement, that the pertinent problems of
cabotage may be altered or dissipated as international civil aviation devel-
ops. It is the opinion of this writer that the protection of small States
intended by Article 7 is not now, nor will be in the 1970's, necessary for
many of them due to changing circumstances and the innovation of new
concepts in joint international airline efforts, e.g., the Air Afrique plan
and the tentative resolution of the Article 77 issue. If, as Sweden proposes,
the second sentence of Article 7 is deleted, it virtually would be up to each
State to determine its domestic aviation needs without any protection
from an agreement of mutual restraint.
The United States delegation to the Chicago Convention foresaw the
"undesirable" possibility of individual States joining together in the future
to form a type of "international cabotage area." In further explanation of
the United States cabotage proposal, the United States delegate stated that
Clearly, the right of reserved cabotage can be exercised by one country only;
for if a number of countries were to pool their cabotage as between each
other, the result would be merely to exclude nations not parties to the pool.'
The United States delegate assumed the attitude that such pooling of
cabotage would be premised only on discriminatory or exclusive agree-
ments. This, of course, is not necessarily true. There need be no exclusive
agreements regarding the pooled cabotage area, and there need be no
agreements effecting discrimination, according to nationality, against
41 Chicago Convention, arts. 84-87, 61 Stat. 1204-05. Article 84 deals with settlement of dis-
putes, article 85 with arbitration procedures, article 86 with appeals procedures, and article 87
with penalty for nonconformity of arbitration decisions by airlines.
41 Id. at art. 88. Article 88 deals with the penalty for Pon-conformity by States with arbitral
decisions and provides that "The Assembly shall suspend the voting power in the Assembly and
in the Council of any contracting State that is found in default under the provisions of this Chap-
ter."
43 Supra note 40.
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States not members of a cabotage pooling agreement. What could be
effected, and quite legitimately, is the raising of the bargaining price which
non-Member States would have to pay for operating in such an interna-
tional cabotage area. It obviously is this very possibility which the United
States wished to avoid, preferring to protect the concept of bilateral
cabotage negotiations with individual States-unencumbered with having
to consider the political and economic demands of other countries while
negotiating such individual bilaterals. In an event, we have in Article 7
a history replete with non-definitive agreements of mutual restraint,
precatory language, and unilateral expressions of opinions as to just what
constituted cabotage in 1944, and what it hopefully would constitute in
the future. These are hardly sufficient grounds upon which to build a
convincing argument that the concept of cabotage, as provided in Article
7, is definitive, inflexible, and not sensitive to changing conditions. If
States, such as those comprising Air Afrique, wish to pool their sovereign
rights as to internal domestic aviation interests, and let the dictation of
those interest rest with a mutually established international organization
and/or joint operating agency, it could hardly derogate that justifying
facet of Article 7 which was intended to protect those States from
attempted outside domination. If it is argued that Article 7 was intended,
at least in part, to ensure that all States have a fair and equal opportunity
to share in any potential cabotage market, one need only refer again to the
first sentence of that Article which recognizes, unequivocally, that "Each
Contracting State shall have the right to refuse permission to the aircraft
of other Contracting States to . . ." participate within its own cabotage
area. Again, Article 1 of the Convention recognizes the long-standing
principle of customary international law "that every State has the com-
plete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.""
It is submitted that a pooling of cabotage areas to form one international
or collective cabotage area, pursuant to the recognition of the principle of
"absolute and complete sovereignty," would not necessarily contravene the
spirit and intent of the Chicago Convention, especially in view of the
changing political and economic circumstances surrounding the aviation
interests of many Contracting States, and especially if the Swedish pro-
posal to delete the second sentence of Article 7,s or the Secretary General's
proposal to amend Article 7," is ultimately successful.
The Secretary General of ICAO proposed an amendment to Article 7
of the Convention for consideration by the Council during its continuing
study of the Swedish request. The proposed amendment would delete the
second sentence of Article 7 and reshape the first sentence to provide that
Carriage by air of passengers, mail or cargo picked up at one point in the ter-
"Chicago Convention, art. 1, 61 Stat. 1180.
45ICAO Doc. SA 16/1-68/25 (1968), wherein the Secretary General announced inclusion of
a new item for consideration by the Executive Committee, pursuant to the request of Sweden, at
the Sixteenth Session of the Assembly; set forth as Addendum No. 1 of the Provisional Agenda,
A16-WP/1, P/4 (22 Dec. 1967), Addendum No. I (11 Mar. 1968). See also, note 35, supra.
46 ICAO Doc. C-WP/4738, 5 5 (3 Jan. 1968), Addendum dated 13 Feb. 1968.
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ritory of a State and to be set down at another point in that territory is
subject to the laws and regulations of that State."
Quite generally, the amendment arises from an attempt to accommodate
the deletion recommendation of Sweden and to redraft the first sentence
in order to correct one or two inherent ambiguities48 while still retaining
the basic recognition of a State's sovereign rights over its domestic aviation
interests. The proposed amendatory language is not a panacea since it
raises new questions which would have to be resolved." The amendment is
thought to be necessary in order to make sense of the reference to Article
7 in Article 5 of the Convention."
An alternative, to clarifying Article 7 through amendment procedures,
is amendment by deleting the whole of Article 7. This alternative would
make sense to the extent that if the second sentence of the Article is
deleted, pursuant to the Swedish proposal, the first sentence effectively
would remain only as a superfluous reiteration of a recognized principle
of international law. However, there may be an effect of more subtle
import by simply amending the Article in the manner, or similar variation,
of that proposed by the Secretary General. If Article 7, or simply the
second sentence thereof, is deleted, there would always be room for argu-
ment that "general practice in the aviation business" has permitted devel-
opment of an accepted principle that cabotage areas cannot be pooled so
as to exclude any particular carrier from participating in what presently
is considered international traffic, i.e., cabotage has always related only to
points within the boundaries of any one individual State. However, by
specifically recognizing in the Convention that cabotage activities are
"subject to the laws and regulations of that State," it is very arguable
that such laws could be established, within the intent of the amendatory
language, that would manifest the economic necessity of formally integrat-
ing domestic aviation interests with cabotage interests of one or more other
States, e.g., an international operating agency which could be established
by a group of nations such as those comprising Air Afrique. Both the
political and economic environment of many African and Latin American
countries, not to mention those which would participate in the Pan-Arab
Airlines, makes economic and attendant administrative integration in
these areas not only a possibility, but perhaps a necessity.
4
"1Id. at 5 3.
"8 One ambiguity which is alleged to exist is the use of the word "destined" in the first sen-
tence of Article 7. It is believed "destined" could include stopping points in a foreign country
while cargo or passengers ostensibly are being transported by the same aircraft or carrier from one
point in a particular State and destined for another point in the same State. Geographically, this
may be plausible for situations involving contiguous States.
49 One question that immediately comes to mind is whether a State is obliged to establish ap-
propriate laws and regulations, and what the consequences will be (in terms of rights or duties of
other States) if such laws and regulations are not established.
"°Chicago Convention, art. 5, 61 Star. 1181. Article 5 provides, in pertinent part, that with
respect to the right of non-scheduled flight "such aircraft, if engaged in the carriage of passengers,
cargo, or mail for remuneration or hire . . . shall also, subject to the provisions of Article 7, have
the privilege of taking on or discharging passengers, cargo, or mail, subject to the right of any
State where such embarkation or discharge takes place to impose such regulations, conditions or
limitations as it may consider desirable."
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IV. CONCLUSION
It is recognized that legitimate differences of opinion exist regarding the
issues raised, and the projections set forth, in this discussion. On the other
hand, it also should be recognized that the implications arising from the
Swedish request and proposal are far from having been analyzed defini-
tively, both legally and from a policy point of view. It is submitted that
at this time the Swedish proposal to clarify the alleged ambiguities in
Article 7 unexpectedly may succeed in clearing the path to an effective
institution for minimizing the strength of the United States when negoti-
ating bilateral air transport agreements, in the future, with politico-eco-
nomic regional groupings. Further, it will not be sufficient to rely solely
on an accurate legal analysis of the cabotage issues in combating a move
to expand the geographic parameters of a cabotage area. It can be seen
from the tentative resolution of the Article 77 issue that political solutions
to legal problems may prevail, especially when supported by the evolving
trend of bloc voting within the Legal and other Committees of ICAO.
Finally, it is an understood phenomenon that aeronautical matters such
as routes, capacity, aircraft type, beyond points, to name a few, are not
the only items considered negotiable within the framework of bilateral air
transport agreements. Unrelated economic resources and even non-
aviation political alignments are fair game as well. In view of this, the
effectiveness of a cabotage pooling arrangement, or international cabotage
area, may be successfully countered and nullified by the well-developed
aviation countries. On the other hand, depending upon what is available
for negotiation, the effectiveness of such a pooling agreement could be
strengthened substantially.
In any event, it will be interesting to observe the extent to which future
joint international operating agencies, or international air transport organi-
zations, will attempt to alter cabotage areas and the concept of internal
domestic traffic in order to minimize the negotiating strength of advanced
aviation countries, such as the United States, at the bargaining table.
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